Women in the Courts Today: How Much Has Changed by Schafran, Lynn Hecht
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 5
1988
Women in the Courts Today: How Much Has
Changed
Lynn Hecht Schafran
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Lynn H. Schafran, Women in the Courts Today: How Much Has Changed, 6 Law & Ineq. 27 (1988).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol6/iss1/5
Women in the Courts Today: How
Much Has Changed
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Esq.*
Professor Norton began this morning's program by telling us
why the Founding Fathers felt no need to make reference to wo-
men in the Constitution. Adherents of John Locke, they saw the
world divided into family and state, with women confined to the
domestic sphere, debarred from any role in public life. In this Bi-
centennial year, as you look at this panel of women professionals
addressing the Eighth Circuit Judicial Conference, it appears that
we are a world away from the attitudes that shaped the Founding
Fathers' thinking. Yet despite the genuine gains that women have
made, many of the attitudes that prevailed in 1787 prevail today,
with direct consequences for women in the courts. Moreover it is
often judges' assumption, sometimes explicitly stated, that sex dis-
crimination is a thing of the past, that imperils justice for women
in the present.
Fortunately, the Bicentennial also finds us at a point in time
when the issue of gender based bias in the courts has become the
focus of serious attention, with corrective measures beginning to
be taken in judicial and legal continuing education and law schools
throughout the country.
Gender bias has three aspects: stereotyped thinking about the
nature and roles of women and men, which is principally what we
have been talking about thus far this morning; society's perception
of the relative worth of women and men and what is perceived as
women's and men's work-society talks a good game about valuing
the work women do in the home, but when related issues reach
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the courts, in the immortal words of Rodney Dangerfield, they
don't get no respect; and myths and misconceptions about the so-
cial and economic realities of women's and men's lives. All three
aspects of gender bias have deep roots in our history and may af-
fect virtually every area of substance and procedure in the courts.
Because I can only touch on this range of issues this morning, I
have included in your reading materials articles which document
the existence of gender bias in matters ranging from courts' re-
sponse to violence against women to the hiring of women court
employees.1
The Founding Fathers' stereotype of women as properly lim-
ited to home and family has retained its power throughout our his-
tory, with serious consequences for women lawyers and jurists. In
1873 the United States Supreme Court denied a woman a license to
practice law on the ground that God and nature intended women
for the domestic sphere and only men for the occupations of civil
life.2 In 1983 the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Wo-
men in the Courts found that male judges and lawyers frequently
asked female applicants for law clerk and associate positions about
their family obligations and plans for motherhood. They also as-
sumed that the female applicants would want to handle matrimo-
nial and juvenile justice cases: the domestic sphere of the law.3
A few years ago the American Bar Association representative
interviewing Dolores Sloviter with respect to her nomination to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals asked her how she would care
for her husband and children saying "that was expected to be a
woman's role."4
Just last year a speaker at the Florida Judicial Nominating
Commissions Institute instructed the commissioners that they
must ask about candidate's management skills and, "If it's a fe-
male-I don't want to be sexist-but if its a female, to what extent
1. The articles provided in the reading materials were: John D. Johnston and
Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1971). Excerpts. Norma J. Wikler, On the Judicial Agenda for
the 80s: Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the Courts, 64 Judicature 202
(1980); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman: How Stereotypes About Wo-
men Influence Judges, 24 Judges' J. 12 (1985); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Documenting
Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70 Judicature 280 (1987)
[hereinafter cited as Task Force Approach].
2. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
3. New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts, Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts, First Year Report (1984), reprinted in 9 Women's
Rights Law Reporter 129, 144 (1986).
4. Address by Dolores K. Solviter, United States Circuit Judge, Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, Annual Conference of the National Association for Law Place-
ment, Inc. (April 30, 1984).
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can she handle the demands of home, child, shopping?" 5 As you
can imagine, I was flabbergasted to hear this directive stated so
baldly. Fortunately I was the luncheon speaker at that Nominat-
ing Commissions Institute and was able to caution the commission-
ers that not only was the earlier speaker's advice a perfect
illustration of my topic-bias in the judicial selection process-but
a clear violation of Title VII. I later wrote to the speaker with the
same advice. You will not be surprised to learn that I never heard
from him.
Although the number of women lawyers is growing rapidly,
and one wit has opined that the judiciary will soon be a woman's
profession because the pay is bad and the hours are regular, the
number of women in law school must not deflect us from what is
happening to women already established in the profession. Wo-
men are still less than 8% of both the federal and state judiciaries. 6
In the Eighth Circuit itself there are no women on the circuit
court and only two on the district courts.
Stereotypes about appropriate behavior for litigators and ap-
propriate behavior for women combine to keep women out of cer-
tain areas of trial practice, such as top spots in criminal
prosecution and defense, and to confound women trial attorneys
with what sociologists call the "double-bind" for the professional
woman.7 If she displays stereopyically feminine traits such as soft-
spokenness and deference she is dismissed as too soft to do the job.
If she is forceful and direct, she is put down as pushy, abrasive or
worse. Across the country women attorneys report, in the words
of one witness before the New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts, "Aggressive behavior is rewarded or tolerated from men,
and viewed as out of place or even unacceptable from women."8
The difficulty some judges, lawyers and court personnel have
in accepting women as professionals is reflected in behavior to-
ward women lawyers and law clerks ranging from overly familiar
forms of address, to sometimes well meant but inappropriate com-
pliments on appearance, to sexist jokes and sexual harassment. 9
5. Address by Dr. Mel Reid, Eleventh Institute for Judicial Nominating Com-
missions (Jan. 22, 1986).
6. Fund for Modern Courts, Inc., The Success of Women and Minorities in
Achieving Judicial Office: The Selection Process, inside cover (1985).
7. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Abilities v. Assumptions: Women as Litigators, 19
Trial 36 (Aug. 1983).
8. Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, Office of
Court Administration, N.Y. (1986), reprinted in 15 Fordham Urban L. J. 11, 143
(1987).
9. See, e.g., New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts,
supra note 3, at 136-144; Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the
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You will be pleased to know that the federal courts are generally
seen as presenting significantly less of a problem in this regard
than state courts, but the problem is by no means non-existent.
One woman attorney at this conference, for example, was asked by
a district court judge in another circuit to stand, for the sole pur-
pose of his complimenting her on her suit. How does a lawyer es-
tablish her credibility as a professional when she has just been
defined by the judge as a fashion plate?
The roots of the second aspect of gender bias, society's per-
ception of the value of women and women's work, are traceable
not merely to 1787, but to the Bible. Leviticus states that if a man
is killed, his family is to receive fifty silver shekels. But if a wo-
man is killed, her family is to receive only thirty.10
You may think this attitude is remote from today's court-
rooms, but let me tell you about the settlement Union Carbide ini-
tially proposed to offer the families of those killed in the Bhopal
disaster: $30,000 for an employed man, $15,000 for an unemployed
man, $12,500 for a woman, and $10,000 for an older woman.'"
Before you tell me that the lawyers only proposed this schedule
because they thought they could get away with it in India, where
women are held in low esteem, you should know that this settle-
ment offer was devised well before it was known whether it would
have to be approved in India, or by a United States District Court.
An American expert consulted by Union Carbide about this sched-
ule told the company that these categories, "didn't make much
sense, especially in the differentials between men and women: In
the Bhopal area, women contribute more than half the household
income."12 But even he made no reference to the unpaid work
that women in Bhopal, like women the world over, do: bearing and
raising children, cleaning, cooking, sewing, and what I call keeping
the family's emotional motor running.
We frequently see this devaluation of so-called women's work
in damages cases and in many judges' decisions about the division
of marital property at divorce.' 3 Marriage is not seen as an eco-
Courts, supra note 8, at 126-153; Final Report of the Rhode Island Committee on
Women in the Courts, Gender Bias in the Court Environment 11-22 (1984).
10. Leviticus 27: 3-4.
11. Tamar Lewin, Casting an Anthropological Eye on American Consumers,
N.Y. Times, May 11, 1986, at F6, col. 1.
12. Id. (quoting Steve Barnett, cultural anthropologist).
13. See, e.g., New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts,
supra note 3, at 145; Lynn Hecht Schafran, The Single Mother in Court, in Single
Parent Families: Myth, Reality and Social Policy (Elizabeth Mulroy ed. 1988) (in
print); Sally F. Goldfarb, Recognizing the Homemaker's Contribution to Apprecia-
tion of Separate Property, 18 N.Y.St. B. A. Fam. L. Rev. 11 (Mar. 1987); Judith I.
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nomic partnership. Women's unpaid work in the home is not seen
as having economic value of its own, or as having contributed to
the ability of the principal wage earner to focus on enhancing his
earning capacity, his mind unencumbered by domestic concerns.
The Founding Fathers' view of the world as divided into fam-
ily and state, with state being what counts, permeates our legal
system, to the significant detriment of women. Family law issues
such as the award and enforcement of spousal and child support
are the principle issues that bring women into the courts. They
are also the issues our legal system has never valued highly and
that our courts would like to be rid of. How significant that
although family law cases are a, if not the, major category on al-
most every state's docket, to my knowledge only one law school in
the nation requires family law along with contracts, real property
and torts. Today women pursuing family law claims are being
pushed out of the courts and into mediation,14 where there is no
record and no accountability. After decades of struggling to make
the courts treat seriously the issues generated by the domestic
sphere, women are once again seeing these issues privatized.
Moreover, because the courtroom is clearly a part of the public
sphere, women, as creatures of the domestic sphere, have less
credibility there than men and are often subjected to a heavier
burden of proof.
The third aspect of gender bias is myths and misconceptions
about the economic and social realities of women's and men's lives.
In 1972 a Florida appellate court refused to continue a middle aged
woman's alimony, stating that this was the age of women's libera-
tion and that any woman could get a job and support herself ade-
quately.15 This was not true in 1972 and it is still not true in 1987.
And here we come to a critical distinction: the difference between
having gender neutral statutes, which is what Judge Ginsburg has
been talking about, and applying those statutes in a way that rec-
ognizes the actual circumstances of the parties involved. The facts
are that women who have invested their human capital as long
term homemakers have great difficulty obtaining jobs above mini-
mum wage. Women with young children cannot go into the paid
Avner, Valuing Homemaker Work: An Alternative to Quantification, 4 Fairshare
11 (Jan. 1984).
14. See Charlotte Germane, Margaret Johnson and Nancy Lemon, Mandatory
Custody Mediation and Joint Custody Orders in California: The Danger for Vic-
tims of Domestic Violence, 1 Berkeley Women's L.J. 175 (1985); Laurie Woods, Me-
diation: A Backlash to Women's Progress on Family Law Issues, 19 Clearinghouse
Rev. 431 (Summer 1985).
15. Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 271-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
1988]
Law and Inequality
workforce unless they can find and afford that scarce and expen-
sive commodity: child care. Occupational segregation which chan-
nels the majority of women into low paying jobs with little
mobility is still the norm. 16 Yet across the country, women are
frequently reduced to poverty status after divorce by judges who
award only a year or two of rehabilitative alimony on the assump-
tion that these women will have no difficulty in achieving well
paid employment. 17
Misconceptions about the social realities of women's lives are
evident in the comments made by judges in employment discrimi-
nation cases. It is scarcely credible that a major business entity in
the national spotlight because of a sex discrimination suit pending
before the United States Supreme Court would deliberately sub-
ject its women employees to sexual harassment. Yet while the
Hishon case, which determined that Title VII applies to law
firms,18 was before the high court, the defending law firm sub-
jected its women summer associates to a wet T-shirt contest. Dur-
ing the argument of that case, upon being told that sex
discrimination was still an issue for women lawyers, one of the
male justices responded incredulously, "This is 1983. I can't imag-
ine a law firm deliberately discriminating against somebody on the
basis of sex."19
Time prevents my giving more examples, but this remark is
not an aberration. The regrettable reality, which it is sometimes
difficult for a powerful white man-which is what most judges
are-to see, is that although this is the 1980s and there are women
supreme court justices and astronauts, women's and men's exper-
iences of the world continue to be different in many ways because
of gender based bias.
It is not only the failure to be aware of these attitudes and
incidents that can create problems for women in the courts, but
16. See, e.g., Nadine Brozan, Former Wives: A Legion of the Needy, N.Y. Times,
July 29, 1987 at Cl; Displaced Homemakers Network, A Status Report on Displaced
Homemakers and Single Parents in the U.S. (1987).
17. See, e.g., Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). "In this
era of women's liberation movements and enlightened thinking, . . . the woman
continues to be as fully equipped as the man to earn a living and provide for her
essential needs." Id. at 271-72; Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unex-
pected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America
(1985); La Roeque v. La Rocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987) (overturning
award of eighteen months rehabilitative alimony and directive to return to teaching
for homemaker of twenty-five years who had sporadic experience as part-time sub-
stitute teacher but no public school teaching certificate).
18. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
19. Mauro, Yes, Law Firms Do Discriminate, USA Today, Nov. 1, 1983, 104, col.
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the failure to understand the meaning of certain events for the
women who experience them. Last year the Sixth Circuit held in
a Title VII case alleging an offensive work environment,
The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect
on the plaintiff's work environment when considered in the
context of a society that condones and publicly features and
commercially exploits open displays of written and pictorial
erotica at the newstands, on prime-time television, at the cin-
ema, and in other public places. 20
This court's assumption that the fact that women cannot buy
a newspaper without seeing the covers of Hustler and its ilk means
that they are not troubled by this, and its failure to appreciate the
crucial qualitative difference in impact between the magazine
cover on the newsstand and posters displayed in a work area
where, in effect, they define who and what that woman is in that
place, are painful examples of judicial gender bias rooted in mis-
conception. Again, this case is not an aberration.
I began by saying that there are two realities for women in
the courts today: the continuing reality of gender bias, and the new
reality that this problem is beginning to be acknowledged and
addressed.
The program of which I am the director, the National Judi-
cial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men
in the Courts, known as NJEP, was established in 1980 to help
judges understand how gender based stereotypes, myths, and bi-
ases affect decision making and the courtroom environment.21
When NJEP began, knowledgeable judges, lawyers, journal-
ists and others told us that what we proposed could not be done.
We were warned that judges would not accept gender bias as a le-
gitimate topic for judicial education or be willing to engage in the
self-scrutiny necessary to eliminate it. I am happy to say that they
were wrong.
Over the last seven years NJEP has been invited to present
judicial education programs at national and state judicial colleges
across the country, including, among Eighth Circuit states, Mis-
souri and Iowa. Although we have met with some skepticism and
denial-gender bias is a difficult and sensitive problem to discuss-
we have also had many judges tell us, in the words of one judicial
20. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company, 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986).
21. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Educating the Judiciary About Gender Bias: The
National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men in
the Courts and the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts,
9 Women's Rights Law Reporter 109 (1986). The National Judicial Education Pro-




organization, "Your presentation made us focus on a problem that
most assumed to be non-existent." 22
As an outgrowth of NJEP's work, chief justices across the
country are appointing task forces to investigate gender bias in
their own state court systems and recommend ways to eliminate
it.23 Among Eighth Circuit states, the Minnesota Supreme Court
Task Force on Gender Fitness in the Courts was established in
June 1987.
The recommendations of the three task forces which have
completed their work, which stress education, are now being im-
plemented. Judicial and legal continuing education programs are
going forward using the data developed by these task forces. Law
schools are being asked to integrate this data into their own curric-
ula, so that the next generation of lawyers and judges can be sensi-
tized early on. The American Bar Association last year endorsed
judicial education about gender bias for both state and federal
judges. 24
Professor Norton quoted to you Abigail Adams' letter urging
the Founding Fathers to "Remember the Ladies" in their "new
Code of Laws." As we know well, they did not. I congratulate the
Eighth Circuit for "Remembering the Ladies" in this Bicentennial
program, and trust that the other Circuits will soon follow your
excellent example.
22. Id. at 116-17.
23. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Task Force Approach, supra note 1. As of April,
1988, gender bias task forces in New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island had is-
sued reports and were in an implementation phase. Task forces established by, or
with the endorsement of, the chief justices of Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
Utah and Washington State were in various stages of organization and data collec-
tion. Task force formation was in an exploratory phase in Colorado, the District of
Columbia, Kentucky, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Wisconsin and Vermont.
Readers interested in establishing gender bias task forces in their own states
should consult Lynn Hecht Schafran and Norma J. Wikler, Operating a Gender
Bias Task Force: A Manual for Action, available from the Women Judges' Fund for
Justice, 1225 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, (202) 462-4243.
24. Summary of Action of the House of Delegates, 1986 Annual Meeting (Aug.
11-13, 1986).
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